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PREFACE 
Many recent developments in philesophy of mind have made possible-
new ways of looking at the concepts found in psychological theorie~. 
The works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Gilbert Ryle, J. L Austin, and Alan 
':1 
R. White have pointed a new directfdn in tM examination of ideas 
·, I ' - . , . ' 
which could benefit those working ih the field of psychology in thetr · 
examination of-human action •. Perhaps the value of the endeavours of 
these men will be in showing psychologists that an important aspect of 
their investigati-0n into human behavior is conc~ptual ~· i.e., that the 
scientific findings must ultimately relate to the.concepts we have for 
explaining behavior, and it is how they relate that is at _least half of 
the problem in psychology. As Ludwig Wittgenstein says in Part II of 
his Philosophical Investigations {p. 232). 
The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not-
to be explained by calling it a 'young scienc:e';. 
its state is not comparable with that of physics, 
for instance, in its beginnings. . . . For in 
psyehology there are experimental methods and 
conceptual confusions.·~ .. 
The existence of the experimental method makes us 
think we have the means of solving the p~oblems 
which trouble us; tho~gh problems and method pass 
one another by. · · 
I have fou.nd in Freudian theqry many valuable ideas .about human 
behavior that are marred by what Witt_genstein calls "conceptual con.,. 
fusions". The value -0f psychoanalysts is som,thing that I do not dis-
pute, Nevertheless psychoanalytic explanations are couched in terms 
that in many cqses need examination; these terms tend not only to 
iii 
distort its findings, but also to contribute to an unacceptable view of 
human action. 
The unconscious mind as conceived by Sigmund Freud presents some 
interesting problems for the Twentieth Century analytic philosophers. 
The purpose of this thesis 1s to draw out some of these problems, and 
deal with them as problems in the ph11osophy of mind. 
Moreover, I hope to show that an appeal to the unconscious when 
dealing with motives confuses the issue. The unconscious forces that 
Freud saw at work on his patients (forces that the patient himself was 
unaware of), I believe can be seen in a more natural light as the ordi-
nary sorts of things we call motives, but motives that the agent will 
not admit to. 
I hope to show that the model of mind Freud works with is itself 
open to severe criticism via Wittgenstein's comments on the problem of 
other minds. Freud did not ask himself when introducing his theoreti-
cal model, "What does this model do to explain how we successfully 
operate with mental terms. 11 It seems clear after investigating the 
Freudian model, that Freud can make no sense of common third person 
predicative sentences such as, "John love Mary 11 , or, "Fred is a 
patriot'', i.e., his model does not allow us to use these sentences with 
any degree of assurance. Operating on his model of mind any remark 
about another person's knowledge, likes, dislikes, motives, and aspi-
rations, is a remark about an interior mental state, process, or event 
that may not be justified by observation of what the person does or 
says. For, according to Freud, the agent may act in a definite pat-
tern that we would, for example, identify as partiotism, but be moti-
vated by something completely different, i.e., by something that he 
himself is completely unaware of. This may or may not.be a coninon 
dccurrence, b.ut it certainly throws doubt on motive· ascriptions -and 
breaks down any assurance we may have that a person i~ motivated by 
anything we might postulate from watching him or talking to him. This 
is what 11 meant by saying that Freud casts doubt on our successful 
operation with the concept of motive. 
My claim is not that Freud makes some sort of verbal slips in 
doing psychology. Rather he is confused about what we do with certain 
psychological concepts, particularly the concepts of desire and motive. 
This confusion leads him to postulate hidden metnal realms that somehow 
control our behavior. 
In the last ~art of my thesis I will show the surroundings of some 
of the more .co111T1on cases where a person gives h-1 s own motives, and 
where,a person talks about another person's motives. There is a two-· 
fold purpose in doing this; first I hope to show an alternative to· 
Freud's id~as about motives, and secondly I will briefly try to show 
how motive can be seen according to a modified teleological account as 
explanation:, we:'.· offer for human action. 
, In writing a thesis a great deal of advice is necessary. I wish 
to express my gratitude for the time and patience of Dr. Robert T. 
Radford, without whose help this thesis could not have been written. I 
am also indebted to Or. Thomas C. Mayberry and Gerald Clements, who 
along with Dr. Radford, aroused my interest in the philosophy of mind, 
and served as fine examples of what a philosopher is. I wish to 
express a debt of gratitude to Dr. Walter Scott and Dr. Neil Luebke who 
have also provided help and encouragement in my academic career at 
Oklahoma State University and who showed me the value of scholarly work 
v 
in philosophy. Last, but not least, I am indebted to my wife, Pamela, 
for technical help, typing and devotion that helped me to get this 
thesis prepared. 
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FREUD'S THEORY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS 
In order to understand Freud's concept of the unconscious mind we 
must get a clear understanding of what Freud intended the concept to 
explain, and how he viewed the development of unconscious motives, 
desires, and wishes, 
It is clear that Freud was working with a particular model of the 
mind. In order to understand the unconscious mind and its workings, we 
must first see the model as a whole, and thus see the unconscious as a 
part of this whole. 
Let us begin with a condensation of Freud's model as found in An 
Outline of Psychoanalysis, 1 Here he sets out to explain the "psychical 
apparatus" by studying its development in individuals through the vari-
ous stages of life. His model of the mind is one of various "mental 
provinces" which interact with one another and are developed, with one 
exception, at temporal periods in an individual's life. The exception 
to this developmental model of the provinces of the mind is the id. 
"The oldest mental province is the id, it contains everything that is 
inherited, that is present at birth . above all the instincts. 112 
The mind, according to Freud, is not a tabula~' but rather has 
in it a collection of reactions to stimuli that we as members of the 
animal kingdom have in common with the rest of the phylum. The id, at 
a very early stage of development, undergoes a special development, the 
1 
2 
outgrowth of which is the ego. 3 The ego serves as a mediator between 
our animal nature (our instinct for survival, propagation, etc.) and 
the environment, The memory, for instance, is one aspect of the ego 
that overrides the blind function of our instincts to remind us of past 
occurrences in which such a stimuli was present and such a result was 
obtained by such an action. The ego in no way modifies the drives of 
the id, but rather postpones fulfilling these drives to appropriate 
times and/or places, that will bring a maximum reward. As such, its 
development is the earliest real mental development; for here we find a 
reasoning process directing the activity of the id. 4 With the ego 
comes consciousness of the external world. For Freud, the ego includes 
consciousness and controls, and shapes our reaction to the external 
world. In Freud I s paper 11 The Ego and the Id 11 , he says; 
We have formulated the idea that in every individual 
there is a coherent organization of mental processes, 
which we call his e1o, This ego includes conscious-ness, and it contras approaches to motility, ... 
it is this institution in the mind which regulates 
all its own constituent processes, and which goes 
to sleep at night, though even then 15 continues 
to exercise a censorship upon dreams, 
The next stage of development of the 11mental apparatus 11 brings 
rules, norms, and standards into consideration in our decisions about 
action. The repository for the behavioral norms Freud calls the 
11 superego 11 , The superego is acquired primarily from one's parents and 
other author·! ty figures, and represents the sum of their norms, rules, 
and standards. One supposedly feels a need for adopting these stand-
ards because of a need for acceptance and love from the parent (and 
later 11 parent substitutes 11 ), and a fear of disapproval or rejection if 
these rules are borken. These two components (love and f~ar), Freud 
sees as strong, almost primary, drives. The superego, after its 
3 
I development, can be seen as conscience, or "moral serise 11 , and as such 
is a check on the ego and id. 6 
Before acquisition of the superego, the child operates totally on 
a pleasure-pain principle, with the ego being a device for weighing the 
pleasure and/or pains that are the consequences of particular actions, 
and making decisions on only this consideration. The superego works 
along the same lines, but pleasure and pain take on a new dimension, 
i,e,, one is no longer solely concerned with pure sensory gratification 
or mere acquisition of status, but one, so to speak, has to 11 live with 
his conscience", The pain and pleasure takes on an "internal aspect" 
and mental anguish over the breach of adopted standards now has to be 
taken into account in the total picture. 
The working of the superego, therefore, goes beyond gross hedonism 
and makes the pursuit of happiness a subtle activity, Given that one 
has certain drives for sense gratification and desires for status and 
elevation over the common run of mankind (the influence of the id and 
ego), one also has certain standards that cannot be broken in the pur-
suit of these primary goals, The superego gives one the rules for act-
ing, and if one breaks these rules one pays the price of authority 
figure rejection and the consequent mental anguish, 7 
From the above skeleton outline of the Freudian analysis of the 
working of the "psychic apparatus", let us progress to the subtleties 
of the system. The first point that must be made clear is that the 
agent is rarely aware of the minor clashes and major battles that take 
place inside him when decisions must be made, i,e,, the agent does not 
feel the pressures exerted by the id, ego, and superego when they make 
their demands. 
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The 1d, with its animal lusts and blind fears. is seldom felt as a 
real motivating force because the. ego realizes that there are other 
pleasures besides mere survival or mere copulation and reproduction. 
The ego supresses the gross action of the id for the sake of long range. 
subtle pleasure. The ego is devisive and cunn1n~ about pleasure, 1t 
knows that the pleasure of power, of wealth, and of social standing are 
longer lasting, and in the end will serve to provide much greater pleas-
ure, than the momentary impulses of the id. 
The workings of the e~o, however, are just as unprincipled as the 
workings of the id. What Freud is telling us is that there is perhaps 
only one thing in man that is innate; the id manifested in gross self 
interest. Just as the ego and id, the superego also works on the prin-
ciple of self interest. In the case of the superego, we have self 
interest re-defined, i.e., the concept of "self interest" now becomes 
to some extent "self expectation" as defined by the values instilled by 
one's peers or the expectations of the community in which one is raised. 
The ego is the inner process whereby one gets one's "self image", 
i.e., one's conscious self estimation. In order that one gets a self 
image that does not conflict with the rules of the superego and the 
desires of the ego (the desire to see oneself as being in an elevated 
or superior position), there i-s instinctual material from the id, past 
experiences (memories) and desires arising fro~ various stages of fixa-
tion of the sexual impulse that must be dealt With. 8 For one idea that 
could damage one's self estimation is the idea of the anamalistic 
nature of the individual as represented by the id. 
Freud sugg·ests that in many, if not in most, cases the ego cannot 
effectively rationalize the phenomenon to be dealt with when it is 
·. 5 
presented on a conscious level. The consctous realization of, for 
instance, sexual feelings toward one's own parents can only cause pain 
ta the man who wishes to see himself as a paragon of virtue (this being 
the working of the ego). What happens in this case, and cases like 
this, is that one denies entry of the material to the conscious level. 
One, so to speak,- pushes the material away from conscious consideration. 
This protective function of the ego Freud calls 11 repression 11 • 9 
But the damaging u.rges, memories, and fixations cannot be cancelled 
out, for there is no such thing for Freud as absolute forgetfulness. 
What happens to the material, according to Freud, is that it gets buried 
at a level of the mind that is rarely accessible to consciousness. 
Putting something out of conscious consideration means hiding it, not 
losing it. This hidden material is relegated to a region of the mind 
Freud ca 11 s "The Unconscious. 1110 Thus the urges of the id are now 
"contained" at this level of the mind and are not constantly pushing 
toward the surface as they did when we were infants. 
Thus, the unconscious serves as a repository for deep seated 
desires, urges, and feelings that the ego cannot admit to, i.e., that 
the ego cannot rationalize with the rest of its picture of itself. 
Hawever, this materi a 1 sti 11 exerts an influence on the ego in a way 
that the ego is unaware of, i.e., not by presenting itself for con-
scious consideration, but rather exerting what Freud calls "psychic 
pressure." 
The rejection from consciousness of certain "psychic material 11 
does not mean that the ·material does not still make its influence felt. 
What happens is that the desires, urges, etc., come to consciousness in 
a disguised form that does not directly affront the ego. They are 
6 
disguised to a greater or lesser degree as the material offends the ego. 
It is in this disguised form that dreams come to us, and it is in many 
cases how motives for action originate, i.e., as disguised forms of ego 
damaging, repressed, facts about oneself. 11 
Since the primary focus of this thesis is on motives, let us look 
at how, according to Freud, the unconscious affects our motives. To do 
this, let us look at a case Freud takes up in his sixteenth lecture, 
"Psychoanalysis and Psychiatry 11 • 12 The case involves a fifty-three 
year old woman who was married for thirty years. She was brought to 
Freud by her son-in-law because she was by her unhappiness, making the 
living situation of her family uncomfortable. The cause of her unhappi-
ness, and the bad feelings between her and her family, Freud discovered, 
was an anonymous letter she had received informing her that her husband 
was having an affair with another woman. The patient knew enough about 
the h0usehold situation to be sure that the letter was written by a 
jealous housemaid and the purported events never occurred. Neverthe-
less, she acted as if the affair actually took place, i.e., she 
repr0ached her husband for having an affair, was suspicious, and showed 
all signs of doubting his loveo 
This case is complicated, obviously enough, because the woman is 
seemingly operating under the delusion that her husband was having an 
affair, but at the same time she is aware that it is false that her 
husband is, or was, having an affair, i.e., she acts as if something 
happened when, in fact, she knows it didn't. Freud's question is, 
"What motivates this woman's behavior?" 
His explanation comes in the form of a series of observations 
about behavioro Freud comes to see the woman's behavior as the product 
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of an unconscious motive, i.e., a repressed motive. He first notices 
that the woman almost invited the servant to write the letter concerning 
the alleged affair, i.e., the woman introduced into a conversation with 
the servant the fear she had of her husband being unfaithful with 
another servant, of whom the servant to whom she was speaking was very 
jealous. About this event (the conversation) Freud says, 
So the delusion acquires a certain independence of 
the letter; it existed beforehand as a fear--or as 
a wish?--in her mind. Besides this, the further 
small indications revealed in the bare two hours of 
analysis are noteworthy. The patient responded 
very coldly, it is true, to the request to tell her 
further thoughts, ideas, and recollections, after 
she had finished her story. She declared that 
nothing came to her mind, she had told me everything; 
after two hours the attempt had to be given up, be-
cause she announced that she felt quite well already 
and was certain that the morbid idea would not 
return. Her saying this was naturally due to resist-
ance and to the fear of further analysis. In these 
two hours she had let fall some remarks, nevertheless, 
which made a certain interpretation not only possible 
but inevitable, and this interpretation threw a sharp 
light on the origin of the delusion of jealousy. 
There actually existed in her an infatuation for a 
young man, the very son-in-law who had urged her to 
seek my assistance. Of this infatuation she herself 
knew nothing or only perhaps very little; in the 
circumstances of their relationship it was easily 
possible for it to dljguise itself as harmless ten-
derness on her part. 
Freud's analysis of this case, briefly, is that the infatuation 
the mother-in-law felt for the son-in-law could not come into her con-
scious mind, i.e., her 11 self-image 11 • The ego, could not allow for this 
kind of feeling since it would not match her expectations or the 
socially instilled norms of behavior between her and her son-in-law. 
Thus, the infatuation was buried at a very deep level of her mind and 
exerted a psychic pressure which found release in a modified form. 
Freud tells us how the 11 displacement 11 of the infatuation came into her 
conscious mind. 
If not merely she, old woman that she was, were 1n 
love w1th a young man, but 1f only her old husband 
too were in love with a young mistress, then her 
torturing conscience would be absolved from the 
i nfi de 1 i ty. The phantasy of her husband 's 1 nfi de 14-i ty was thus a cooling balm on her burning wound.l 
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In this case the question was "What motivated the woman to act 
toward her husband in this manner?" According to Freud, the answer 
would be that her repressed desire for her son-in-law exerted a psychic 
pressure in her unconsciouso This caused modification and a distortion 
of the desire; the distorted desire then manifests itself in her 
actions. In Freud's analysis, the motive was the infatuation, and can 
be properly called "an uncenscious motive". Freud makes this very 
clear in the passage follewing the above cited one. 
Of her awn love she never became conscious; but its 
reflection in the delusion, which brought such ad-
vantages, thus became compulsive, delusional, and 
conscious. All arguments against it could naturally 
avail nothing; for they were directed only against 
the reflection, and not against the original to 
which its strength was due and which lay buried out 
of reach in the unconscious.15 
This example shows the direct workings of the unconscious in the 
life of one of Freud's patients. The workings of the unconscious in 
this examp 1 e, however, do not give us the full picture of the way Freud 
saw the unconscious mind in operation. 
To fully explain Freud's concept let us look at the distinction 
between three concepts Freud employs; conscious, preconscious, and un-
conscious. Let us start with that which is conscious. Freud sees that 
which is conscious as that which we have in mind at any given time, 
ioe,, if one is thinking about one's mother at t 1 then at t 1, one is 
conscious of the thought of one's mother. If at time t 2 one is think-
ing of one's wife then one is conscious of the thought of one's wife, 
9 
but not conscious of the thought of one's mother. What happened to the 
thought of one's mother one had at time t 1? According to Freud, the 
11 thought of one's mother 11 is stored in the mind at the level of the pre-
conscious. The preconscious level is one which is neither conscious, 
for by Freud's schema one has to be thinking the thought for it to be 
conscious, nor is it unconscious, for this is reserved for that which 
is repressed as damaging material. But rather this thought is stored 
at a level where it can be recalled, perhaps easily, perhaps with 
difficulty; but this material will not be censored by the ego. 
The greatest amount of "stored material" according to Freud as 
unconscious, In the unconscious region of the mind is all that we have 
repressed, and the bulk of the mental processes which make up our daily 
"mental life 11 • What he means by this, as explained in An Outline of 
Psychoanalysis, is that we are not consciously aware of the thought 
processes that are involved in thinking; all we are aware of is the 
result of the thought processes. Furthermore, unlike repressed 
material, the processes of the mind can never be brought to the level 
of consciousness. The only way we can understand these 11 processes 11 is 
to make plausible inferences about their nature based on what is given 
in consciousness. These processes, Freud contends, are locked in the 
"unconscious proper" and can never be brought to the level of the pre-
conscious, and thus to the level of consciousness, i.e., this is infor-
mation that we can never give as first hand experience. 
A question which must be asked at this point is, 11 D0es the uncon-
scious exert pressure on the motives of 'normal I people, or is the 
role of the unconscious in motivation only operative in neurotics?" In 
Freud's essay, 11 The Unconscious, 11 he brings up this point. 
••• we may say that as long as the cs /conscious/ 
controls activity and motility, the mental conditTon 
of the person in question may be called normal. 
Nevertheless, there 1s an unmistakeable difference 
1n the relation of the controlling system to the two 
allied process of discharge. Whereas the control 
of the system Cs over voluntary mot111ty is f1rm1y 
rooted, regularly w1thstand1ng the onslaught of 
neuroses, and only breaks down 1n psychosis, the 
control of the Cs over affectiv,e development 1 s 
less firmly established. Even in normal life we 
can recognize that a constant struggle for primacy 
over affectivity goes on between the two systems 
Cs and Pcs £preconscious,, that certain spheres of 
influence are marked off one f1gm another, and the forces at work tend to mingle. 
In referring to the "system Pcs 11 as a system Pcs 11 
10 
whose sphere of influence is partially involved in controlling the 
affective (emotional) growth of a normal person, Freud draws a border-
line between normal behavior and what he later goes on to describe as 
abnormal behavior. The abnormal person is one whose emotional life 
(which includes one 1 s motives) is totally under the control of the un-
conscious, i.e., he 1s not conscious of the motives he has at the times 
he acts. The normal person, on the other hand, is aware of the struggle 
between forces acting on him (the forces originating in the Pcs) and to 
some extent can become aware of some of the forces, that is, to know 
what the motivational forces are. 
This, however, still leaves an element of "unknown forces at work" 
even on a normal person, for the system 11cs 11 is not that of which we 
are aware, but only that of which we can become aware (and this is 
usually only through psychoanalysis). Moreover, Freud later goes on to 
talk about many cases in which the man on the street is caused to do 
something by unconscious pressure, e.g., girls with beautiful hair oft-
times "manage their combs and hairpins in such a way that their hair 
comes down in the middle of a conversation", or Freud himself forgets 
11 
to keep profes·sional appointments that are not lucrative and forgets to 
catch a train to his brother's in order to see a painting he has wanted 
to see. 
Now the above cases do not involve neuroses; they are the ordinary 
actions of ordinary people. Furthermore, Freud sees all actions as 
caused by some mental agency and those acts which we, as agents, may 
see as uncaused (such as verbal slips and convenient omissions) are 
really caused by that of which we are not aware; the contents of the 
unconscious. Freud states this quite candidly in Beyond The Pleasure 
Principle. 
Psycho-analytic speculation starts from the impres-
sion gained on investigating unconscious processes 
that consciousness cannot be the most general 
characteristic of psychic ~recesses, but merely a 
special function of them.17 
Thus, unconscious motivation is not a sign of sickness, nor useful 
only in relation to exceptional cases and unusual circumstances, but 
rather is an element in our ordinary 11mental life 11 • The reason for 
pointing this out is to bring the unconscious into the realm of that 
about which we can talk. For in cases of obsession, for instance, we 
do not know wh~t 'to say without appealing to some psychological theory. 
However, contrary to Freud's claims., we do have successful ways of 
explaining ordinary actions, via motives, that employ non-technical 
language. 
We can see from this outline of Freudian theory that this cen-
struct s.eemingly has great explanatory power. Freud attempts to 
expJain how the past influences the present and he attempts to show the 
place of instinct in our lives. He also tries to show why we sometimes 
encounter actions that seem to be at variance with an actor's stated 
motives. Moreover, Freud has tried to show us that the motives we do 
profess (are conscious of) are, in many cases, only a part, or a dis-
tortion of, the real reasons we have for acting. Though this theory 
seems to have explanatory power, I believe that it embodies some con-
fusions about important mental concepts. I shall argue that Freud is 
particularly confused about the concepts of 11motive 11 and 11desire. 11 
12 
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CHAPTER II. 
A CRITICISM OF THE FREUDIAN THEORY OF MIND 
I have briefly discussed what Freud says about unconscious motives 
in the first part of this thesis. I will now critically examine that 
way of talking about motives. 
A basic distinction that Freud does not observe is the distinction 
between motive and desire. For Freud, all motives are species of de-
sire.1 Thus, in the example given in the first chapter, (the older 
woman with the unconscious desire for the younger man), we.find the 
jealousy as a by-product of a repressed affect or emotion which becomes 
an unconscious desire. That this is a typical example of the workings 
of the unconscious mind, as Freud sees it, can be seen from examining 
Freud's work, 11 The Unconscious," {particularly the chapter on "Uncon-
scious Emotions"). This preference of Freud for explanations in terms 
of desire leads Paul Ricouer to call Freudian discourse the "semantics 
of desire 11 • 2 
If I read Freud correctly, what he says is that the unconscious 
desire produces a mode of action which is a disguised form of the 
action t~at the desire would cause if it were conscious. Thus, one has 
(in the sense of 11 possesses 11 ), a desire which one is not consciously 
aware of. This way of talking raises two questions. First, in what 
sense can one be said to 11 have 11 a desire, and second, what sense can be 
made of talking about desires as being something that one is unaware of. 
14 
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In answering the first question let us look at how Freud arrived 
at the idea that so and so 11 has 11 a desire. Let us take, for example, 
Jones' desire for candy. When Jones is at his office, and is working 
intently, thinking of nothing but the task at hand, does he then desire 
candy? Since Jones is thinking only about his work, we must say that 
he does not want candy at this moment. (A minimal condition for his 
wanting candy, at a particular moment would be his thinking of candy at 
that moment,) So what then happens to Jones' desire for candy? It 
seems that we must say that Jones has a latent desire for candy at any 
given moment, and his latent desire is something that he 11 has 11 • 
According to Freud, this is the same sense in which Jones 11 has" 
all of his desires, both conscious and unconscious. The way Freud 
approaches "desire: and 11 have 11 is in the sense of, "Jones has a nickel". 
This is what led Freud to posit the Unconscious and Preconscious as 
regions of the mind; for just as Jones has a nickel that he carries 
about in his pocket, so must he have a place for carrying around his 
desires that he is not at that time manifesting. So the phrase, 11 Jones' 
desire for candy 11 , is the name of something Jones (when he is at work) 
carries about in his preconscious . 
• 
That Freud indeed thinks this way is obvious on examining a pas-
sage for 11 The Unconscious 11 • 
Our mental topography has for the present nothing to 
do with anatomy; it is concerned not with anatomical 
locations, but with regions in the mental apparatus, 
irrespective of their possible situations in the 
body.3 
Here Freud posits a non-spatial realm or region in which our 
ideas, desires, etc., are located. That he needs this region for the 
processes of desires and ideas is evident from his claim that ideas and 
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desires are somehow located in different parts of the mental apparatus, 
and his insistence that ideas and desires are never lost, but rather 
are stored. This is evident upon reading the following passage. 
With the first, or topographical, is bound up that of 
a topographical separation of the systems Cs and Ucs 
and also the possibility that an idea may exist simul-
taneously in two parts of the mental apparatus--
indeed that if it is not inhibited by the censorship, 
it regularly advances from one position to the other, 
possibly without its first location or record being 
abandoned.4 
To posit a psychic storehouse in which a person carries about his 
permanent desire, (or his knowledge, memories, and abilities) is on the 
one hand unnecessary, and on the other hand misrepresentative of the 
way we talk about desire. So, as a mode of explanation for Jones having 
a desire which he is not at this time exhibiting, the adoption of the 
idea of the pre-conscious is both superfulous and confusing. To see 
this, let us look at why we say, 11 Jones likes candy 11 , and notice that 
the 11 pre-conscious 11 is unnecessary in explaining why or what we say 
when we say this. 
If we are familiar with Jones, and have seen that on any occasion 
when candy is present, he eats all he can get, we can say with justifi-
cation, 11 Jones likes candy 11 , without reference to any mental event or 
object, But one may ask, 11 What is Jones• justification for his saying 
that he likes candy? 11 • This presupposes that he needs a justification 
for this first person statement about himself. But he can remember 
how well he likes the taste of candy, and he can remember that he oft-
times gets cravings for candy. He is not, however, locating a psychic 
entity when he remembers these things, nor is his liking the taste of 
candy anything he carries about in any region {spatial or non-spatial); 
if he carries this liking about anywhere, it is in his tongue. 
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It could be said that the above is an unfair analysis of Freud's 
view of desire, i.e., that Freud referred to emotions and desires as 
processes rather than entities. It is true that he does use the idea 
of 11 process 11 in his later work more predominately than he does 11 entity 11 , 
but he does at various points use both. Furthermore, it seems that he 
is ofttimes using 11 desire 11 as if it is a sensation word. I will exam-
ine the possibility of desire as an ambiguous internal process, and as 
an internal feeling or sensation and see if one can make sense of this. 
It will now be only fair to see if we can make sense of Freud's 
idea of 11 x1 s desire for y11 in terms of the desire being a process, the 
"process of desire" (of which we are conscious) works like this; at a 
certain time while Jones is at work or at home he experiences 11 in him-
self" a certain feeling (sensation) that makes him want to go out and 
get candy, or go to the cabinet and get some candy. It is this 
internal causal feeling (desire) which Jones has that is his desire for 
candy. 
My objection to this is that no one could ever know or even, 
usually, infer that the cause of Jones• candy eating was the occurrence 
in him of a feeling, and thus we could never say of Jones with any cer-
tainty that he had a desire for candy. Even if Jones reported that he 
had a feeling (desire) just before he went for the candy this would be 
very weak evidence that the desire caused the action, since (for all he 
knows) the cause was some other inner happening simultaneous to the 
feeling he reported. The main objection to this is that no reasonable 
person could put any trust in the sort of induction that Freud's view 
makes necessary when an observer says of Jones, 11 He must have had a 
desire for candy at noon today, because he walked six blocks to the 
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candy store. 11 Moreover, the process view of desire, wanting, knowing, 
remembering, and all our mental concepts makes nonsense of the ways we, 
in fact, operate with them. 5 
Let us take another example of this. According to Freud all our 
mental concepts name processes in the mind. Now, when a mathematics 
professor gives a test to a student, what is he testing? Is he testing 
the student's ability to demonstrate what he knows, or is he testing 
the student's knowledge of the material? If we say that the professor 
wants a demonstration of knowledge then we can also say that if there 
is no demonstration then there is no knowledge. Why then is it neces-
sary to think of knowledge as something other than what is demonstra-
ted? To the professor, and to us in our ordinary affairs, what the 
person says and writes~ what he knows; if he can't do it, then we say 
that he doesn't know it. If the reverse were true we would have to 
have grade reports that read, 11 Abi l ity to demonstrate-- 1 C 1 , Knowledge 
of the subject--undetermined 11 • Isn't it often the case that we think 
we know something--say a poem--but when asked to recite it we are un-
able to do so. Shouldn't we say here, 11 I thought I knew it but in fact 
I didn 1t. 11 The place to look for someone's knowledge is in what he 
says and what he does (this is, in fact, what we do); we do not look at 
any mental process, for how would this be done? And if this is how we 
operate with mental concepts, then a reference to "Inner events" is 
both unnecessary and confusing. 
The above is a description of how we use words like 11 know 11 , 
11desire 11 , etc. It is not a theoretical structure or recommendation, 
it is a reminder. The point is this; talking of a mental process in 
connection with these concepts does not help us, but rather it throws 
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doubt on the successful way we have of operating with these concepts. 
Freud's way of talking about desire in the conscious state makes 
desire something that is internal, and that which is external is only 
the manifestation of that internal state, process, or event which is 
the desire. But our most important use of desire is that of explana-
tion by desire. In explanations by desire we are not concerned with 
the internal workings of the agent's mind alone, but also with the cir-
cumstances of the action. 6 These circumstances are public and usually 
involve conventions. For instance, if Jones takes off in the middle of 
the working day and walks down to the candy store, and a superior asks 
a colleague, 11 Why did Jones take off in the middle of the day? 11 , the 
colleague will explain Jones' action in terms of his desire for candy. 
The public circumstances on which his analysis rests is his seeing 
Jones walk in the direction of the candy store, as he has done before 
in the middle of the day. The conventions that are involved in this 
explanation by desire are that taking off in the middle of the day is a 
fairly serious offense for just a walk. So Jones' colleague infers 
that Jones must have wanted something badly to take time off. 
What one does in thinking of desire as an internal event is to 
lift the concept out of its context of action. 7 This can be seen if 
we look at how we use 11 desire 11 • For instance, we say of a person, if 
he goes out of his way to obtain candy, that he desires candy. Where-
as, if another person is passed a tray of candy at a party and takes 
only one piece all evening, and qoesn't normally buy candy, then we can 
say, if asked, 11 X doesn't like (desire) candy". It is contexts like 
these in which we learn to use 11 desire 11 and in which it makes sense, 
for in circumstances like this we have considerations on which we 
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decide if so-and-so likes (desire) anything. Here we can answer ques-
ti ons 1 i ke, 11 Wha t makes you think Jones 1 i kes candy? 11 If we take words. 
out of their surroundings (make them stand for mental events), then 
they lose their meaning, for words have meaning just in so far as we 
can use them and they are always used in some situation or in relation 
to some situation. 
The positing of an inner state, process, or event, which the word 
11 desire 11 points to or names, in effect, isolates that mental concept 
from the outer world of human action. If we do this then it makes no 
sense to say of another person, 11 He was right when he said Jones has a 
desire for candy 11 • If we can't say this, then we can't say, 11 He was 
wrong when he said Jones has a desire for candy 11 , for right and wrong 
make sense only insofar as they are opposites. 
We cannot say that any characterization of Jones is right or 
wrong at all if we follow Freud's model to its logical conclusion, and 
it furthermore raises the irresolvable question, 11 Is what Jones calls 
desire the same as what I call desire?", thus making the concept of 
desire useless. For if we approach 11 desire 11 and other mental concepts 
from Freud's point of view all we have in answer to this question is, 
11 He acts the same as I act when I desire something, therefore he must 
analogously have the same thing I call desire. 11 But this sentence 
makes it look as if I identify my desire. If this is true, then by 
what criteria do I identify my 11 inner experiences 11 , and how am I to 
teach others (particularly children) to use 11 desire 11 ? 
In considering the first question, let us look at passage #288 in 
Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. In this passage, 
he is showing how we might teach someone about a sensation word (in 
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this case, 11 pain 11 ), 
If he now said, for example: 10h, I know what 1pain 1 
means; what I don 1t know is whether this, that I 
have now, is pain--we would merely sli'ake our heads and 
be forced to regard his words as a queer reaction 
which we have no idea what to do with. (It would be 
rather as if we heard someone say seriously: 11 1 
distinctly remember that sometime before I was born, 
I believed .... '). 
That expression of doubt has no place in the language 
game; but if we cut out human behavior, which is the 
expression of the sensation, it looks as if I might 
legitimately begin to doubt afresh. My temptation 
to say that one might take a sensation for something 
other than what it is arises from this: If I 
assume the abrogation of the normal language-game 
with the expression of sensation, I need a criterion 
of identity for the sensation; and then the possi-
bility of error also exists.a 
One might ask, "What would a criterion for desire be like?" It 
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looks as if what we would have to do is to remember what the feeling of 
desire is like and ask ourselves, "Is this similar to the feeling I 
call 'desire'?". But what check could one run on one's memory of a 
particular feeling? And how then can we say we remembered rightly? 
Wittgenstein makes this point very clear in passage #265 of his 
Philosophical Investigations. 
Let us imagine a table (something like a dictionary) 
that e,dsts only in our imagination. A dictionary 
can be used to justify the translation of a word X 
by a word Y. But are we also to call it a justifica-
tion if such a table is to be looked up only in the 
imagination?--'Well, yes; then it is a subjective 
justification. '--But justification consists in 
appealing to something independent--'But surely I 
can appeal from one memory to another. For example, 
I don't know if I have remembered the time of 
departure of a train right and to check it I call 
to mind how a page of the time table looked. Isn't 
it the same here?'--No; for this process has got to 
produce a memory which is actually correct. If the 
mental image of the time table could not itself be 
tested for correctness, how could I confirm the 
correctness of the first memory? (As if someone 
were to buy several copies of the morning paper to 
assure himself that what it said was true). 
Looking up a table in the imagination is no more 
looking up a table than the image of the result of 
an imagined experiment is the result of an experi-
ment.9 
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The point is that if desire is an internal process (and that means 
that the word 11desire 11 refers to an internal process), then ne reason-
able person could say that he desires anything with any degree of cer-
tainty. He could hate the thing which he says he desires; for all he 
knows, because it is quite possible for him to be mistaken in his 
identification of that inner feeling. 
The second question--about teaching the word 11desire 11 --shows 
another difficulty with Freud's view. In teaching a sensation word to 
a child, or a person who aoes not speak the language, what is required 
is what David Pears10 calls a "teaching link". This link is something 
that the person learning the language can connect with the word, and 
what is necessary for this is some observable phenomena. This is 
necessary because if the sensation word were linked to some inner 
experience, then the teacher would be unable to make the connection 
for the learner between the word and the situation in which the learner 
could use the ward. That the language of sensation is taught in con-
nection with outward behavior is important because it shows us the way 
we learn the language and therefore, how we use words like 11desire 11 • 
Freud's thesis about desire then, misrepresents the way language is 
used. 
I would like ta suggest that it is this way of looking at 11desire 11 
(as a ward that refers to internal states, processes, or sensations), 
that makes the concept of unconscious desire plausible. If one were 
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clear about how one learns, and operates with, the word "desire", then 
one would not be inclined to look for hidden (internal) desires, and 
thus, one would not be inclined to look for hidden desires of which he 
or another person was unaware. 11 For the idea of a hidden (in the sense 
of that of which one is not aware) desire depends, for its sense, on an 
idea about desire in general being a mental phenomena (hidden in the 
sense of being out of reach of an observer), for the idea of an 11 uncan-
scious desire" entails two things: (1) a desire which is internal, and 
(2), the person being unaware of this internal desire. 11 Inner events" 
are both unnecessary and confusing. 
An argument for unconscious desire (and thus, unconscious motives) 
can be reasonably advanced. When Freud looks for unconscious motivation 
he does the same sort of thing that we do when we look for conscious 
motives, but with an important difference that distorts these similar-
ities. The action he looks for is a displacement of the action the 
desire would elicit if it were conscious. Thus, when Freud analyzes a 
person's unconscious motives, among other things, he looks at the per-
son's past, at his present circumstances, and at his attitudes. This 
is a sort of standard thing one does when one wants to get at another 
person's motives, when that person is unavailable for comment. However 
we do not look for something that the agent is unaware of, and here the 
similarities begin to fade. 
However reasonable this sounds, I still believe Freud makes some 
mistakes with this approach. 
To understand Freud's use of 11motive 11 and 11 desire 11 , let us look at 
the context where Freud uses these terms. The patient that Freud treats 
either comes to Freud or is brought to him. The patient seeks help from 
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Freud in solving some emotional difficulty that either he is aware of, 
or his family or friends notice. In short, the patient needs help from 
a psychologist. From a person who is mentally or emotionally disturbed, 
and in the process of gaining help, we find the person asking someone 
else about his motives for exhibiting behavior that is judged to be 
strange. This marks an extreme change in the context of motive giving, 
and it is not unusual that a different way of talking about motives 
would emerge here. 
In the psycho-analytic setting it looks as if the agent is unaware 
of his own attitudes in connection with the actions he performs. 12 It 
is then the psycho-analyst's job to supply the missing motives for the 
patient. But on what grounds does one decide that a person is unaware 
of his motives? Obviously Freud decides, because he has an agent per-
forming an action for which the agent can give no reasonable explana-
tion, or for which the explanation he gives is highly doubtful. 
One may ask appropriately; 11 What makes Freud think that the 
patients he treats are not lying to him when they give unacceptable 
motives and perhaps when they can give no motive at all they are cover-
ing something up? 11 This is a question that a Freudian would not be 
able to answer; or at best his answer would be very tenuous. For, as I 
argued earlier, if a desire (motive) could be internal, then .2.!!J.x. one 
person could know what that desire is, and everyone else would have to 
be in the dark unless he tells them truly what his motive is. 
One might ask in connection with this, "What sense does it make to 
say, 'He will never admit that to himself 1 ?11 We might say this when 
we see certain motives behind a person's actions, but we also know the 
actor well enough to know that the motive we see in his action would 
not be one that he would accept. This is particularly true of ego-
tists. 
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Some proponents of the privileged access·. theory believe tha,t if a 
person does not eventually acknowledge a motive, then it cannot be said 
to be his. This is one quite natural outcome of the view that motives 
and desires are 11 private 11 , 11 internal 11 happenings. For if they are, 
then there is only one person who can comment on my motives and he has 
the final word. 
However, if one examines court cases where it is the motive of 
the defendant that is in question, this idea reveals itself as a bit of 
nonsense. For if we accept .Q!llx. the defendant's word for his motive in 
shooting Jones, then we would never have any premeditated murders, only 
cases involving supposed mistaken identity or self defense. Even if 
the court were trying a mass murderer it would never find him guilty of 
murder, for he could always say that he was target practicing and 
several passers by got in the way. 
What makes Freud think that there are unconscious motives is that 
the motives his patients give do not rationalize their actions. This 
idea, however, relies on another idea, namely, that we are experts on 
the motives that we avow. But if we do not buy the idea that we are 
experts on our own motives, then motives we do not acknowledge are not 
necessarily unconscious for what made Freud think they were was that 
his patients disavowed them 0r would not mention them). Rather, we 
find people having motives that are not compatable with their 11 self-
image11; and because of this they will not admit to having them. Let 
us take up a specific case to illustrate how this might work. 
In Chapter I of this thesis, I mentioned a case that Freud used 
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as an example in his lecture 11 Psycho-analysis and Psychiatry 11 • In this 
case we find a fifty-three year old woman who chooses to believe that 
her husband is having an affair with a housemaid, although the evidence 
clearly indicates otherwise. In response to this belief, the woman 
becomes extremely jealous of her husband, and reproaches him about many 
imagined offenses not connected to his imagined unfaithfulness. In 
other words, she acted as if he had had an affair while being intelli-
gent and well informed enough to know that he did not. The real prob-
lem, according to Freud, was that the woman had an unconscious desire 
for the young man who brought her to Freud (the young man was also her 
son-in-law). The desire was repressed because of the damage that a 
conscious recognition of it would do to her self-image. In short, she 
felt guilty about her infatuation for a younger man who was her son-in-
law. The only thing that could help salve her unconscious wounds was 
if she could discover that her husband was in a similar situation, and 
in a sense this would be an absolution. 
It is interesting to note what Freud says about the process of 
psycho-analysis in this situation. 
The patient responded very coldly, it is true, to 
the request to tell her further thoughts, ideas, 
and recollections, after she had finished her story. 
She declared that nothing came to her mind, she had 
told everything; after two hours the attempt had 
to be given up, because she announced that she felt 
quite well already and was certain that the morbid 
idea would not return. Her saying this was naturally 
due to resistance and to the fear of further analy-
sis. In these two hours she had let fall snrnP 
remarks, nevertheless, which made a certain inter-
pretation not only possible, but inevitable, and 
this interpretation threw a sharp light on the 
origin of the- delusion of jealousy.13 
This example, I believe, gives us an important insight into how 
Freud uses the terms 11 unconscious desire 11 and 11 unconscious motive 11 • 
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For here it seems obvious that the 0rdinary use of the sentence, "She 
will not admit this to herself", plays the same role as "unconscious 
desire". When Freud encounters the resistance on the patient's part, 
what could be happening is that the patient suddenly comes to see a 
pattern in her behavior which she finds repulsive (this is by Freud's 
own admission). Because the patient has something to hide, this does 
not mean that that thing is completely hidden from her. Perhaps Freud 
started to tie together the verbal slips and pointed out to her the 
fact that she displayed unduly affectionate behavior to her son-in-law. 
The woman sees that perhaps she did at one time or the other wish she 
were in her daughter's position and she had noticed how &exually attra~ 
tive her son-in-law was. But when confronted with this evidence, she 
refuses to recognize (admit) that she was sexually attracted to her 
son-in-law, Perh~ps she rationalizes her actions toward h'er son-in-law 
as a normal display of affection to a relative, and her fe'el ing toward 
him as a natural feeling one has to the person who married her daughte~ 
The fact that people do rationalize their motives and in many 
cases not those of other people tends to make one believe that one is 
not in a particularly favorable position in always giving an unbiased 
assessment of one's own motives. It can be argued that when a person 
gives his own motives to another person, what he does is to tell that 
persen what his considerations were when ha acted as he did .14 I don I t 
think I will be claiming too much when I say that we ofttimes try to 
see what we do and what we feel in the best possible light, whereas 
when we judge the actions of others with whom we have no emotional 
ties, we tend to be fair, or critical. 
It appears then, that what Freud would call an unconscious 
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motive is one to which the agent who has it will not admit. What Freud 
goes on to do in psycho-analysis, is ta give his assessment of the 
patient's motive, which is a more honest evaluation of the patient's 
actions. The success of the psycho-analysis depends on the patient's 
acceptance of his motive as the analyst sees them. This forces the 
patient to recognize the attitudes that he has for what they are, and 
thus to take the positive action toward changing them, or accepting this 
part of his or her character as described by the analyst. 
In the previous example, it may be the case that the woman did, to 
some extent, recognize her infatuation with her son-in-law. This may 
have produced an "internal struggle" in which she alternated between 
blaming herself for feeling as she does, and rationalizing her feelings. 
Freud may have been right in attributing the cause of her actions 
toward her husband to her infatuation with her son-in-law, and her feel-
ing that if her husband was in a similar situation she would be somewhat 
absolved. However, he does not need the idea of an unconscious motive 
to bring this off, for what makes this explanation plausible is that 
this is, in fact, the way people sometimes operate when they have a con-
scious motive, i.e., we are familiar with non-mysterious cases of self-
absolution proceeding along similar lines. 
To put what I have been saying in another way, there is no practi-
cal difference between what Freud calls a "repressed or 'unconscious 
motive or desire", and a more familiar case of a person not being 
honest with himself or with others about his considerations in acting. 
Moreover, psycho-analysis could proceed with less doubtful assumptians 
if it did change its concept of unconscious desire. 
To carry this point a bit further, let us look at an idea 
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introduced by Jean-Paul Sartre in his book Being and Nothingness.15 
In his chapters on 11 Bad Faith 11 and 11 The Unconscious", he presents a 
devastating attack on Freud's madel of man. 11 Bad faith", in Sartre's 
terminology, is lying to oneself. Sartre sets out to distinguish lying 
in general from lying to oneself. Truth is transcendent (outside of 
oneself) and this sort of truth is what the ordinary liar is hiding. 
By this he means that when a person intends to deceive, he does it as a 
conscious act. People, in this way, lie to others, i.e., the lie is a 
hiding of truth from the 11 0ther 11 (a person or thing other than the 1 iar). 
In 11 bad faith" there is no separate deceiver and deceived; they 
are one. What does this do to the person practicing 11 bad faith 11 ? The 
person can not at one and the same time lie to himself and be deceived. 
To lie is a conscious act, and the 11 unity of consciousness" requires 
that one know of the lie. Now, if one knows of the lie, how is one 
perpetually deceived? The answer Sartre poses is that this is a very 
unstable state which never the less achieves a durable form in a way of 
life, i.e., one, so to speak, "lives out the lie 11 • 
Sartre expands on how bad faith works in Freudian theory in his 
chapter on 11The Unconscious". The psycho-analysis of Freud, he says, 
splits the unity of consciousness into ego and id, thus making a lie 
without a liar. The id, according to Freud, is not a part of me, i.e., 
I have no available contact with it, and I cannot discover it without 
help (and then only to a limited extent). The ego is me, but is influ-
enced by the id. Here, the id can be the liar, but is not me (there-
fore, it is 11 the Other") and can influence behavior, i.e., I can be 
lied to by myself without holding myself responsible for the lie, 
because part of my 11 self 11 (the id) is the 11 0ther 11 (not me, therefore 
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like another person). The id serves as a censor, blocking the contents 
of the "unconscious complexes" from view, but yet letting these 11 com-
plexes11 influence my behavior. 
But it has been found in certain stages of psycho-analysis that 
the subject offers resistance to the probings of the ana1yst. This, 
the analyst says, is the action of the id breaking through the psychic 
make up. But we have two things at work here, the id (censor) and the 
complex (what is to be revealed via psycho-analysis). The id then must 
know what is being held back because it is censoring that complex from 
the analyst. The id, therefore, must choose this complex to hold back, 
and be aware that it is doing so in order to function. It functions to 
elude the analyst, having a goal in mind, and therefore must in some 
sense be aware of the direction toward which the analyst is aiming, as 
well as the complex it is hiding. The censor in doing this exhibits an 
awareness of itself as repressing a truth and this brings Sartre's 
circle round--the censor is in "bad faith". 
All the verbage and special terms the psychoanalysts have thrown 
up is to no avail. For in this phenomenon (resistance in the last 
stage of psychoanalysis), we see a self-aware "thing" which can no 
longer be seen as the other-than-myself because it makes conscious 
choices in influencing my behavior and choices that I am aware of. All 
they have shown is a dual activity within a unity which is me (my aware-
ness, my thoughts, my actions). 
Sartre also accuses Freud of not fully explaining the connection 
between the "repressive drive" and our actions. We can not and do not 
apprehend the 11 drive 11 that affects us; it is at a distance, but yet it 
interacts with the ego, or our everyday reactions, actions, and 
awareness. There is a mystical link that Freud has not supplied (as 
Sartre has shown, this cannot be the censoring device, because of its 
self-awareness). 
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Sartre gives an example of what psychoanalysts would refer to as 
an example of the censoring device that actually is an example of bad 
faith; the frigid wife. The wife consciously avoids the pleasure of 
sexual intercourse by distracting herself consciously during the act. 
Where the Freudians want to say that what is the cause of her frigidity 
is some "deeply rooted" and hidden phenomenon. Sartre wants to say in 
effect 11 It is all in plain view, she distracts herself, appealing to 
anything more is unwarranted and unjustified". 
There is, I believe, another possible interpretation for what 
Freud calls an unconscious motive that does not require as harsh an 
indictment against the person involved as Sartre's view. It seems to 
be the case that our actions are not always transparent to us, i.e., 
they proceed from a minimum of thought and refleciton. If at a later 
date we do reflect on the promptings for our action, we ofttimes do, 
at that time, construe what we did in light of the way we would like to 
see ourselves, i.e., we posit the kinds of attitudes that we approve 
of because we like to see ourselves as having certain praiseworthy 
character traits and motives. 
These revisions of Freud's view would not mean that we completely 
abandon psychoanalysis, but the psycho-analyst would have to look at 
his patients, not as persons on whom mysterious forces were at work, 
but rather as people who need to be taught to be more self-aware and 
less guilt ridden about natural inclinations. In many cases {e.g., 
psychopathy) the analyst might serve as a moral adviser, making 
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patients more responsible for their actions and perhaps showing them 
what is in their best interest. There are, in fact, tendencies in psy-
chology that point in this direction. 
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CHAPTER III 
A POSITIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF MOTIVE 
In this, the last chapter of my thesis, I will give an elucidation 
of the concept of motive. In this account there will be no theoretical 
structure employed; nothing more than a simple description will be used 
to explain how the concept is employed in our language. I will show 
how the giving of motives is the giving of an explanation; and I will 
show how motives are related to wants, desires, attitudes, and charac-
ter traits. These matters are all tied together in a teleological 
account of motives. This elucidation shows how we use the term 
11motive 11 in a successful and non-mysterious way, and thus shows the 
Freudian analysis to be an unnecessary alternative. 
The Role "Motive" Plays In Our Language 
The first consideration involved in this examination should be the 
question, "What role does the concept of motive play in our language?" 
To deal with this question, let us look at some typical sorts of cases 
where motive gjving is practiced. The following are four such types of 
cases that suggest themselves: 
(1) Cases where a person other than the agent is answering ques-
tions about an agent, such as, 
"What made him do that?" 
"What caused him to do that?" 
"What prompted him to do that?" 
"What persuaded him to do that?" 
"What led him to do that?" 
"What was his purpose in doing that?" or 
"What was his motive for doing that?" 
(2) Cases where the agent is answering questions like the above 
about himself: 
(3) Cases where an agent spontaneously avows his motives; 
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(4) Cases where one person, without being asked, volunteers what 
he believes to be another person's motive (or motives) for 
doing certain acts. 
In the first type of case, what is being asked by these questions? 
How do people arrive at answers to such questions about other people's 
motives? One might be asking, in the above questions, what is "behind" 
the actions that the agent performed, i.e., what the agent saw in his 
own actions. The answer would enable one to find out more about the 
agent or more about the action. When we find out about the motive for 
which the agent performed an action, that action takes on new signifi-
cance, or a new dimension, in light of the agent's attitude. 
When we try to determine the motives of another person (when we 
adswer questions of the sort mentioned in number one), what we do is 
.. -'l..: 
show how the actions of the agent fit in with the intentions, goals, or 
personality of the agent. The ways we do this are various. For some 
actions it takes a familiarity with the agent to posit motives; but for 
otber actions the agent does not have to be known at all. An instance 
of the latter sort would be a detective determining the motive for the 
murder of a rich man who is found on some back street with an empty 
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wallet. An instance of the former would be, for example, a person who 
is trying to determine his friend's motive for leaving his wife. 
In the murder case the detective would use as evidence in deter-
mining the motive of the murderer the fact that the rich victim usually 
carried large sums of money, and the fact that he was found in a rough 
part of town where robberies are often committed. These considerations 
would lead him to believe that the motive for murder was robbery, i.e., 
that the person who murdered him wanted money and expected that the 
victim would have money. 
In the case of the man leaving his wife, his motive is less trans-
parent. If the person's motive was being discussed by a number of his 
friends, it is likely that there will be some contention over why he 
left her. Character traits might be mentioned, e.g., that Mr. X was 
an irresponsible person. Certain facts will be brought to bear, e.gt, 
Mr. X was known to be seeing his secretary. His frinds might infer 
from this that he left his wife in order to be with his secretary. 
In the first case we have a detective explaining what he saw as 
the cause of the murder, or the intention of the murderer, by examining 
the circumstances of the murder. In the second case we have friends of 
Mr. X explaining why he left his wife by citing certain things they 
know to be true of Mr. X or his situation. It is clear in both cases 
that the question is about the various considerations the actor has in 
deciding to do what he did, and the evidence one accepts in positing· 
the motives of another person are of a factual nature, rather than 
just a matter of opinion. For instance, in the case of the detective, 
it is a fact that the victim was found in an area where the crime rate 
is high, and it is a fact that he ordinarily carries large sums of 
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money, etc. In the case of the man who left his wife we might cite the 
fact that he behaved in an irresponsible manner in many instances, or 
the fact that on the night before his disappearance he was dancing with 
his secretary, and was known to desire her company. 
In the second category of motive giving, where the agent gives his 
own motive, the explanation of the action in question is of a different 
nature, and the agent may be doing one of several different things. 
For instance, he might be attempting to 11get off the h0ok 11 for some-
thing he did. Perhaps the agent is seen shooting his neighbor's dog, 
and the neighbor asks the agent for his motive, implying perhaps that 
the agent shot the dog out of spite. The agent tells his neighbor that 
the dog was exhibiting signs of hydrophobia and that he shot the dog in 
order to protect himself and his neighbors from a rabid dog, thus ex-
culpating himself from implied charges that he did something cruel or 
unwarranted. 
People sometimes carry on another activity with first person 
motive givings which we may call "information giving". For instance, 
two people meet at a social gathering; let us say one is a young man 
and the other a young weman. They talk for awhile and become inter-
ested in each other. The young man tells the young woman about. himself; 
that he was in school and during his senior year he quit going to 
classes and took a trip to California. The girl questions him as to 
why he went to California, rather than staying in school and graduat-
ing. In answering the question, the boy tells the girl something 
about what kind of a person he is; he tells her about how he sees 
college as meaningless and the value he finds in first hancl"',,,ex,fJe·rience, 
and that he is a natural romantic and is attracted by the bright 
lights of Hollywood. 
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In telling the girl these things he is not trying to exculpate 
himself from any charge, because none was made. He perhaps wants to 
impress the girl by showing how adventurous he is, and tells her about 
his senior year just so she will ask him about his motives for leaving 
school. In effect he is giving her information about his wants, 
desires and expectations. 
In the above case, the boy might not have even waited for the girl 
to ask him why he left school, but proceeded to tell her straightaway 
why he did it. (This would be a case of the third type; spontaneous 
motive giving.) Here, though, the purpose of his telling her his 
motive for leaving school would still be to give information about him-
self. 
An instance of the fourth type (spontaneous third person motive 
assessment) would be a spontaneous character assessment. The speaker, 
Mr. Jones, i~ telling his friend, Mr. Smith, about another person, Mr. 
Johnson. Jones gives, as a basis for his claim that Johnson is a good 
fellow, a situation where Johnson donated a large sum of money to the 
United Fund. Not only did Johnson give the money to the United Fund, 
Jones claims, but he did it from an altruistic motive, i.e., he did 
not give the money for the purpose of a tax deduction. 
In this instance, Mr. Smith is receiving information about 
Johnson, (that he gave money) and he is also receiving information as 
to why Jones thinks that this was altruistic; his desire was for the 
well being of others and not for selfish purposes. 
Let us consider these ordinary functions of motive giving, and 
see if there is a common factor among them that would define the con-
cept of motive. 
In the examples of third person motive givings, the predominant 
purpose for the motive giving is for showing why something was done. 
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We give motives to explain the action via the wants, goals, or the in-
tention of the actor. This can be seen by noticing, first of all, that 
the motive giving is in answer to a question about the actor's motive, 
and by noticing that in the examples of this sort that were given the 
facts about the action from an observer's viewpoint are known and what 
is problematic is the "inspiration" for the action. Giving the inspi-
ration for the action via motive givings redescribes the action in 
terms of how the agent saw it, for it is assumed by the questions 
asked that this is what is wanted, i.e., not more facts about the 
action, but a redescription in terms of the agent's interest. So in 
the first example, what is asked for in the third person motive giving 
is a redescription, i.e., an explanatory description in terms of the 
interests of the agent. As in all explanations, there is evidence for 
the acceptance of one explanation by motive, rather than another (this 
is pointed out in the detective example and the example of friends of 
the delinquent husband offering a motive for his behavior). 
In first person motive givings as an answer to a question, the 
function of the motive giving is essentially the same as third person 
motive givings. The example of exculpation by motive giving lets the 
person who shot the dog off the hook by his saying, in effect, 11 ! did 
not see myself as performing a vicious or unwarranted action", by say-
ing, "The dog exhibited a 11 the signs of hydrophobia 11 • Thus, the agent 
explains the action in terms of what he saw in it; i.e., he redescribes 
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it as having a praiseworthy goal. When someone exculpates himself by 
way of giving a motive (as in the example of the man shooting his 
neighbor's dog), he can be seen as saying, "This may be what you saw in 
this action, however, I saw something else. 11 Again, there are consid-
erations of a factual nature that could serve as evidence for the 
motive explanation of the action. 
In the other example of motive givings of this type (the "informa-
tion giving" example) the elements of explanation and grounds for its 
acceptance are present. The young man in this example can be seen as 
explaining what kind of perso~ he is by citing something he did and 
telling why he did it. The citing of the action alone does not give 
this kind of information about a person unless the motive is trans-
parent. If the young lady finds out later that her young man does not 
do the sorts of things ©ne expects an adventurous person to do, then 
she will have cause to doubt his explanation of why he quit school. 
In the last example, what Jones is doing is giving Smith reasons 
for believing that Johnson is an altruistic person. He does this by 
way of telling Smith about Johnson's action, and explaining how this 
actiGn can be seen as altruistic. He does this by pointing out 
Johnson's motive, e.g., by showing that Johnson did not give the money 
to the United Fund as a tax write off, and no other motives are 
apparent. He redescribes the simple act of giving money in terms of 
ideals, i.e., in reference to what Johnson saw as a desirable human-
istic end. In doing this, Smith gives information about Johnson by 
pointing out what Johnson saw as the ends of his action, i.e., that 
for the sake of which Johnson did the action. 
It is clear from the exposition of the examples that common to 
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all these cases of motive qivinas is the exolanatory role of the motive 
given. A. R. White, in his The Philosophy of Mind, recognizes this 
phenomenon. He writes, 11 The word 'motive' signifies a kind of explana-
tion, not a factor that can occur in explanation. 112 
Let us examine this claim and see why White holds it. First of 
all, White sees a "factor in explanation" as the kinds of things one 
mentions when explaining why the person did whatever he did. For 
example, we may explain an action by citing an inclination or desire 
that the agent had, and by doing this we supply the motive. This idea 
seems quite odd until one notices that when one asks for a motive, one 
is asking for a redescription of the action in terms of the further 
ends for the sake of which the action was done. (This can be seen in 
the examples given above.) 
We can ask about John's motive by asking, 11 Why did John do that?", 
or "What made John do that?", or "What was John's reason for doing 
that?"; these general questions can be used in asking, "What was John's 
motive for doing that?". In each case we get an explanation, and in a 
motive explanation certain of the agent's desires, etc., are mentioned 
as factors. By mentioning these factors, the motive for the action is 
given, i.e., a certain sort of explanation (a motive explanation) is 
given by giving the agent's wants, desires, goals, etc .. For instance, 
I may desire a pack of cigarettes and thus walk to the store to get 
them. If someone wants to know my motive for going to the store I will 
tell them about my desire for cigarettes. Both a desire and a motive 
must be for something, but a desire for some object furnishes a motive 
for doing what one must do to obtain that object. The motive is not 
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for the object, the desire is, i.e., the motive is for an action (going 
to the store), the desire is for the cigarettes. 
To ask for a motive is to ask for a particular type of explanation. 
We give a motive type explanation in terms of wants and desires. 
Here we can see another important distinction. White points out 
that the source of much confusion in philosophy of mind has been caused 
by an identification of motive with desire. The above explanations of 
what asking for a motive entials shows this important distinction. To 
make a more solid case for the distinction, White goes on to show that 
there are things that can be said of desires that cannot be said of 
motives. Motives cannot be lifelong, or momentary, fierce or gnawing, 
satisfied or unsatisfied, nothing arouses or thwarts them, they cannot 
be cultivated, produced or suppressed, nor can they occupy one's mind. 
(These are the kinds of things one can say about desires.) 3 Motives 
are always for the sake of something; desires are always for some 
specific thing, which we call its object). Thus, we see that the older 
Woman in Freud's example (the case of the misplaced jealousy) has a 
motive for acting jealously, not a desire for being jealous (the 
grammatical oddity of this phrase is enough to show the point). All of 
the above points can be easily seen if one keeps in mind the uses we 
have for the concept of motive--asking for explanations, and giving 
explanations. 
One might object to this last statement by way of saying that not 
enough evidence has been marshalled for this conclusion. Evidence for 
a grammatical claim such as this can be produced by showing the circum-
stances in which the concept is employed. 
Writers such as P. H. Nowell-Smith and Gilbert Ryle believe that 
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the concept of motive is employed only when the action in question is 
disreputable or strange. 4 Although this analysis is not correct, as I 
believe my examples indicate, I do believe that they have struck on 
something that is fairly common in the background of the use of the con-
cept. It seems true that if the motives for which a person does some-
thing are transparent (motives such as generosity and politeness often 
being of this sort), we do not question them about why they did the 
action in question. It is when we are puzzled as to the considerations 
of the actor for doing what he did that we are most often inclined to 
ask about motives. For instance, when someone acts out of character, 
we might wonder about new considerations upon which he is acting. But 
we never wonder what consideration a person is acting on if he acts in 
character, if we know the person's character to begin with. 
What this points out is simply that in many cases we ask about 
motives for strange and disreputable acts simply because we want an 
explanation of unusual behavior. We generally do not need to ask about 
common-place behavior. But what if the person in question is a dis-
reputable person, motivated by the most base of motives; then we ask 
about his motives if it looks as if he was motivated by honesty. With 
cases such as this, I sugge~t, Ryle's and Nowell-Smith's ideas about 
motives break down. 
Motive and Attitudes 
In the analysis of motive I have given, I have from time to time 
employed the idea that what motives tell us about is an agent's con-
siderations in doing what he did. Let us now look further at what 
these considerations may be. 
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Let us consider the case of a man, Mr. Jones, who is invited to a 
formal dinner where his ·associates and.his boss are present. When it 
is time for dessert to be served, ·a large plate containing chocolate 
cake is passed from guest to guest. When it comes to Jones, instead of 
taking a piece and passing it on, he sits it down in front of him and 
starts grabbing cake with both hands. He takes about eight pieces and 
passes the plate on, depriving his employer of his piece. After dinner 
a friend 0f Jones says to him, 11 Y0u certainly like chocolate cake". 
Janes replies, "What makes you think I like cake, I didn't eat a bite, 
and as a matter of fact, I hate chocolate". 
Now assuming we know that Jones likes his boss, and doesn't want 
to offend him, what makes his reply so surprising? Well, first of all, 
he exhibited all the signs of liking chocolate cake, while denying that 
he did. What Jones did not do was to supply us with a motive for his 
behavior. 
P. H. Nowell-Smith, in his book, Ethics, claims that behind every 
motive explanation is a "for the sake of" clause which tells us for 
what consideration the action was done. 5 In the above case we would 
expect Jones to tell us the end for the sake of which he embarrassed 
himself in front of his employer and friends, for we expect that he 
had a value that he held above the opinions of the other guests. 
This consideration, or value, Nowell-Smith says, can be expressed 
in terms of a pro or con attitude. This is why Jones' answer to our 
question is so odd; we expect him to have a pro-attitude toward 
chocolate cake and he says he doesn't. To illustrate Nowell-Smith's 
ideas of "for the sake of 11 clauses and pro and con-attitudes in motive 
.,. 
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explanation, let us see if we can interpret the examples given at the 
first of this chapter in these terms. 
The examples for the third person motive use are, (1) a detective 
investigating a murder, and (2) friends attributing a motive to a man 
who ran away from his wife. In the first case the detective concludes 
that the man was murdered for his money, Here we could say that he was 
murdered for the sake of his money, and in this context, this is just 
another way of saying 11 for 11 , It is redundant to also say that the 
murderer has a pro-attitude toward money, as we have said as much when 
we say, 11 The victim was murdered for his money 11 , We might say that the 
murderer wanted the money and in saying this we mention the murderer's 
wants, and this is to cite a pro-attitude of the murderer. 
In the second example, the friends of the man who left his wife 
decide that he had been seeing his secretary and left his wife for his 
secretary. Now, we don't want to say that he left his wife for the 
sake of his secretary, but rather that he left his wife out of love 
for his secretary, However, this is another way of saying, 11 He left 
his wife because of his desire to be with his secretary 11 , or, 11 He left 
his wife for the sake of his secretary's feelings 11 , Here, we mention 
the agent's desires in the first quoted sentence, but not in the second 
quoted sentence, In the second sentence it is obvious that the agent 
has a pro-attitude toward his secretary 1s feelings, though the pro-
attitude words ( 11want 11 , 11 desire 11 , 11 interested in 11 , 11 like 11 , etc.) are 
not mentioned. But it can be said that he wanted to please his secre-
tary. This last sentence mentions 11want 11 , which is, according to 
Nowell-Smith, a pro-attitude word. 
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A. R. White in The Philosophy of Mind also sees the concept of 
desire as being related to motive in this way. He writes, 1'Whenever 
that 1t can be said that someone acted from such and such a motive. it 
can also be said that he wanted so and so. Greedy men want possessions. 
ambitious men want power, vindictive·men want to get their own back, 
vain men want to show off and patriotic men want to serve their 
country. 115 
This is not to say that if a person does something, just because 
he wanted to do it, he had a motive for doing that thing. Ofttimes 
wants go no further than just wants, i.e., the idea of a want (as in, 
11 I want a piece of candy 11 ) is in many cases the most simple or basic 
explanation for an action. For example, it would be very odd to ask a 
man why he wanted a piece of candy if we already know that he likes 
candy. All he could say here is, 11 ! just want it 11 • 
We can see from this that wanting a thing is not the same as 
having a motive for doing some action to obtain that thingsw i.e., 
wants do not always produce motives. Wanting Xis not always a 
motive for X. But wanting Y is a motive for doing X, if Xis likely 
to lead to Y. Wants are not as closely related to the concept of 
motive as some have thought, but are a factor in a motive explanation. 
A Teleological Account of Motives 
From what has already been said in this chapter, it follows that 
when we ask for a motive (i.e., a certain sort of explanation) we are 
asking about what a person wanted from his action. This is another 
way of saying that we want to find out the considerations upon which 
the agent acted. P. H. Nowell-Smith had the same thing in mind and 
called wants "pro-attitudes" or "con-attitudes". He also recognized 
that this analysis necessitated a teleological approach to motives; 
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the "for the sake of 11 cl a use that is necessary in motive explanation is 
just another way of saying, "for this end". He also claims that pro-
atti tudes and/or con-attitudes wi 11 be mentioned in the "for the sake 
of" clause, Another way of putting this is that when I give a motive 
explanation I will tell you my wants, or my aspirations, or my desires, 
my feelings, or dispositions. These are all factors in a motive 
explanation and they involve attitudes (either pro or con), Pro- and 
con- attitudes, however, are used in other ways than just to give 
motive explanations, and where they appear they will not always be 
used for this job. 
In presenting a teleological approach to motives, I am relying on 
an article by N. S, Sutherland entitled "Motives as Explanations 11 • 7 
According to Sutherland, there are several classes of actions for which 
motive explanations are not appropriate. Such acts as habitual acts, 
reflex acts, acts which were performed merely for the sake of perform-
ing them, acts which are direct expressions of a mood or an emotion, 
and unintentional acts, are not the sort of actions for which people 
have motives. People who throw ashtrays out of anger, or yawn out of 
boredom, or whistle as they walk are not said to be performing acts 
with something else in mind, i.e., they would not be able to give a 
motive explanation for these actions in terms of something outside the 
act itself. 
Sutherland suggests that these types of actions have one thing in 
common; they are not done in order to achieve some further end. "The 
great majority of motive explanations of actions do fit the paradigm 
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of explaining the action by assigning a further end towards the 
accomplishment of which the action was directed. 118 His paradigm for 
motive explanations is, "He did X because he wanted Y", or "He did X in 
order to achieve Y11 • If, for example, we say that person's motive was 
ambition, that 1s to say that he did what he did in order to obtain a 
more important position, or something like this. If we say that a per-
son was motivated by revenge, we could also say that he did what he did 
because he wanted to repay someone for an injustice. 
Sutherland claims that an examination of character describing 
words shows that nouns formed from them can function as motive words 
only to the extent that they describe ends that a person could pursue. 
11 Gowardice 11 , for example, is a character-describing term that can be 
given as a motive for a person who seeks to avoid danger. 
Sutherland also notices that when we ask for a motive we are ask-
ing for an explanation, and the explanation will be in terms of what 
the agent wanted from his action. Sutherland supports this thesis by 
showing that certain terms can function in motive explanations while 
others do not, just to the extent that they do explain behavior in 
terms of an agent's expectations (ends). He shows how "cowardice", 
"ambition", and "vindictive" (which are all character-describing words) 
can give an agent's goals and thus, function as motive explanations. 
While other character describing terms such as "conceit" and 11timidity 11 
do not perform this function and are not appropriate to motive expla-
nations. 
In support of his contention that motives are only used as expla-
nations he says, "The question of a motive can only arise when there 
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is an action to be explained: there is no such thing as simply having 
a motive--we only have a motive for doing something. 119 
To argue further for this teleological approach, I will draw some 
conclusions about actions for which motives are given, and together 
with some of the other conclusions arrived at in this chapter, they 
will provide premisses for an argument for approaching motives teleo-
l ogi ca lly. 
(1) Motive explanations are given only for purposeful acts. This 
can be seen from looking at what someone might say when asked, 11 What 
made you do that? 11 or, "What prompted you to do that? 11 or, "How did 
you come to do that?" or, "What was the point in your doing that?" or 
"What made him do that?", etc. If the person in question says, "It was 
an accident", or, 11 I (he) didn't do it on purpose11 , or, "Someone made 
me (him) do it 11 , these serve as question stopping statements, i.e., 
after this sort of answer we do not go on further to ask about motives, 
for we know there is none, or at best it was only done because of coer-
cion. After the person has said, "It was an accident 11 , what further 
could he say except to perhaps tell you how the accident happened, and 
this would not be a motive giving statement. Furthermore, accidents 
and coercions are not something a person does; they are things that 
happen to a person, 
The question as to whether these purposeful acts can be desc~ibed 
as being unconsciously purposeful was considered in the second chapter~ 
Here it is the idea of purposefulness that is important, for even in 
unconsciously motivated behavior the purpose can be discovered, but it 
is not readily available to the agent. These explanations of actions 
also redescribe the action, as do motive explanations. The important 
difference is that the expla.nation is not in terms of aiTything the a 
a·genf""wante-tf;· from his action. · ... 
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(2) Motive explanations are only asked for in connection with 
actions that a person performs for which he has a reason for wanting to 
see the action done. As we have seen from the examples, the explana-
tory function of motive givings serves to let us see the action in 
terms of how the agent saw it. This is why we ask for a motive, simply 
to have the action re-explained in terms of the considerations of the 
agent. This presupposes that the agent had considerations, and these 
will be related to something in the action, or something the action 
accomplished. The agent may sometimes have to reflect in order to be-
come clear about the considerations upon which he acted, i.e., what he 
saw in the action. Nonetheles~ if a rational person performs an action 
for which he can be held accountable, we expect him to be able to tell 
us what he wanted from that action. 
We have seen that the factors of a motive explanation are desires, 
wants, and other attitudes. The explanation of action by motive is 
often given by sentences such as 11 ! did ... because I wanted money 11 , 
or, 11 My desire for ice cream made me act impolitely 11 , or simply, 11 1 
like ice cream". But what if we asked a person why he did a certain 
thing, and he said, 11 1 had no reason for doing it 11 • We would not 
regard this utterance as giving a motive because this sentence betrays 
a compulsion or is one of the five kinds Sutherland mentions as not 
being amenable to motive explanations. The reason for this is that we 
expect a motive that a person gives us to explain the action; this sen-
tence does not give us any information about the actor in relation to 
how he saw the action. 
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(3) All that is being claimed by this teleological account is 
that motive explanations are teleological explanations, i.e., explana-
tions about the goals of action. When a pro-attitude is used in giving 
a motive explanation, it will tell us what the action was meant to 
bring about (a satisfaction of a want or desire, the promoting of a 
situation about which the actor has a pro-attitude, etc.) 
The strongest objection against this interpretation is offered by 
Donald Davidson in 11 Actions, Reasons, and Causes 11 • 10 His thesis is 
that a primary reason for performing an action consists in a pro~ 
attitude toward some property of the action and a belief that the 
action performed by the agent will bring about this property. Davidson 
claims that the primary reason a person has for doing an action is the 
cause of the action. Thus, motives tell us about causes of actions, 
and ends of action are themselves causes of action. 11 Central to the 
relation between a reason and an action it explains is the idea that 
the agent performed the action because he had the reason. 11 (p. 72) 
One is tempted to say, 11 0f course he performed the action because he 
had a reason. Is that a 11 you mean by I the reason caused him to act? 111 
He has more than this in mind, of course, but it is very hard to deter-
mine just what he means by 11 cause. 11 He does not want to take a deter-
minist position, as he makes clear in the last part of the article, but 
he wants the force of the determinists' argument (if a person has a 
reason, then he acts). Charles Taylor, in his article, 11 Relations 
Between Causes and Actions 11 , points out that Davidson is using the con-
cept of 11 reason 11 in analogy with another concept, 11 craving 11 ; ••• let 
us imagine a tribe in whose vocabulary there was a word, let us trans-
late it 'craving', which designates a strong and irresistible desire, 
such that if a man didn't do X (or try his damnedest) it couldn't be 
said of him that he had a craving for X. 1111 It is this very strange 
usage of pro-attitude or 11 reason 11 (as in the French concept 11 raison 
d'etre") that makes Davidson's whole thesis seem plausible, if we buy 
this usage, and implausible if we don't. For Davidson's thesis needs 
precisely this kind of use of 11 reason 11 to make reasons causal. 
Taylor has another idea that is very much to the point; he 
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rightly claims that by the very nature of the connection between wants, 
desires, attitudes, and the action itself, we can always give the 
motive for a person doing Yin terms of wanting X to be done or his 
pro-attitude towards the accomplishment of X, etc. As a causal expla-
nation, this has the same force as explaining why opium puts one to 
sleep by saying that it possesses dormative powers. 
What the proponents of a causal theory of motive explanation need 
to do to make their theory meaningful is to show a uniform contingent 
relationship between wants and actions, such that given a want, an 
appropriate action will be forthcoming. But it is obvious that we have 
many wants which we may te 11 our friends about, but never act on. A 
person may be working at a very boring job and want very much to quit, 
but keeps on working because he knows he is doing better fi nand ally 
at his present job than he would if he changed jobs. A poor woman may 
want very much to own a Paris designer original, but sees that there 
is no possible way of acquiring one. A slothful man may want very 
much to rise to the top of his field, but keeps falling back into his 
old way of acting. To point to conflicting causes in these examples 
would be to offer either an after the fact, non-explanatory hypothesis, 
or to qualify one's theory out of existence. This is what happens 
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when a causal theorist says, 11 His ambition will cause him to succeed, 
unless there are other intervening causes. 11 
The proponent of the causal theory may say that given a strong 
enough want (ane that overcomes other wants) the person will act. But 
doesn't this just say that wants that are strong enough to cause us to· 
act will cause us to act. For as a matter of fact, this is how we 
judge whether one want is stronger than another, i.e., that a person 
does X though he also wants Y. This can be easily seen as a circular 
argument and is not an explanation of anything, and in particular it 
does not give the causal theorist what he wants, a tool for predicting 
and controlling human behavior. 
(4) It may be asked, 11Given that a causal interpretation of 
motives does not explain very much, how on a teleological interpre-
tation do motives explain? 11 To see this, let us look a, the concept of 
11attitude 11 , for according to this teleological account of motive expla-
nation, what one gives when one gives a motive is a pro or con attitude 
on which one acted. 
To show what is involved in an attitude, I will refer to two un-
published papers by Robert Audi, 11Attitudes and Their Role in Common-
sense Explanations of Action 11 , and 11Toward a Cognitive-Motivational 
Theory of Character and Personality 11 • 12 
In Audi's paper on attitudes, he spells out what an attitude 
toward some thing or situation entails. 
An attitude toward something is a belief to the 
effect that it lies somewhere on the continuum 
from good to bad, excellent to poor, desirable to 
undesirable, admirable to execrable, appropriate 
to inappropriate, and the like. 
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Audi 1s contention is that these attitudes bring about wants, e.g., 
if I have an attitude toward negroes such that I believe they are un-
desirable persons, I will, among other things, want them kept away from 
my children. Here, as in all cases of attitude, we find actions which 
are the expression of the attitudes one has, and which are made clear 
once the agent gives his motive for the action. In Audi's analysis, 
which I believe in essence to be correct, we find that when a motive 
is given we find out about a person's wants and attitudes (beliefs), 
and thus we may find out about the person's character. He ties wants, 
attitudes, motives, and character traits together in such a way that 
an explanation by motives not only tells us about the action from the 
point of view of the actor, but also tells us something about a rela-
tively permanent feature of the actor (his character). 
It may not be the case that all motive explanations tell us about 
an agent's character, or that character traits can all be defined in 
terms of wants and beliefs. But it is important to note that many 
character traits can be seen in this way, e.g., patriotism can be seen 
as wanting to see the causes of one's country advance and believing 
that it is right to personally try to advance the causes of one's 
country. 
This, I believe, is why a motive explanation, when approached 
from a teleological point of view, is very explanatory. For if it is 
correct to say that attitudes are the basis for one's wants, in the 
sense that we explain our wants in reference to attitude and the deter-
minants for some important character traits, then what we want to find • 
out about an action is the attitude that produced the want, toward the 
satisfaction of which the action is directed. 
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Audi's analysis of attitudes, wants, and motives seems to conflict 
with the analysis of motive given by P. H. Nowe 11-Smi th, but the con-
flict is only apparent. Nowell-Smith groups 11wants 11 under 11 pro-
attitudes11 but he uses 11 attitude 11 in a broad technical sense. Audi 
sees wants as arising from one's attitudes where 11 attitude 11 is used in 
its normal sense. We must notice that what Nowell-Smith is saying is 
something like this: Anytime a person is said to want X, he can be 
said to have a pro-attitude toward X. When put in this fashion, 
Nowell-Smith's idea can be seen as being consistent with Audi's; Audi 
in addition provides an explanation of the connection between wants 
and attitudes. 
There is, I believe, a difficulty with this view which I would 
like to go into briefly. Let us take the case of a Catholic priest 
who seduces a young woman of his parish. To say that the priest has a 
pro-attitude toward unmarried couples having sexual relations, would 
be in this case mistaken. But it would also be mistaken to say that 
the priest did not want to have sexual relations with the woman, for 
we have already said that he seduced her. This is a seemingly clear 
cut case of a person's wants and attitudes conflicing. This presents 
problems for Audi's analysis, since he claims that it is our attitudes 
that bring about our wants. 
The correct analysis of this case, I believe, would be that in 
this instance the priest, holding that fornication is wrong, has a want 
that he himself judges wrong (assuming he is honest with himself and 
sees what he is doing as fornication). This does not mean that at the 
time of the seduction the priest adopts a new attitude toward fornica-
tion. Here his pro-attitude would be toward his own gratification. 
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If he does not feel remorse after the fact (vow not to conttinue in this 
course of action). he must either be called a hypocrite. or he must 
change his avowed attitude toward fornication. 
The view that attitudes and wants are closely related does not 
entail that these attitudes and wants do not change from time to time, 
or that they might change momentarily under special circumstances. If 
a person's attitudes do change in a special circumstance~ and then 
revert to the original, we may say of this person that he lacks the 
strength of his convictions. As an explanation for the seduction of 
the woman the priest may say, "The spirit was willing, but the flesh 
was weak". This, I believe, says, in effect, that in this case the 
priest's former attitude changed under stress, and having recognized 
this (perhaps even at the time of the act) his new attitude toward his 
own gratification proved too strong for his former attitude about 
fornication. Correspondingly, his newly recognized wants (for his own 
gratification) weighed more heavily in his subsequent action. It can 
be correctly said that in this case the priest's actions and his 
earlier avowed attitudes are inconsistent, and inconsistency between 
one set of attitudes and wants and another set of attitudes and wants, 
is no objection against Audi's thesis. 
It seems strikingly obvious to say that if a person acted in a 
patriotic manner, he has a pro-attitude toward his country's well 
being. If it is used, however, in a motive explanation where the per-
son who asks for the motive does not know why the other person acted 
the way he did, then saying that he acted out of patriotism may resolve 
the question of the person who asked about the motive. But does saying 
that a person acted from patriotism cite an attitude? To say that a 
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person has a pro-attitude toward the advancement of his country's cause 
does, of course, cite an attitude and, in fact, is a partial explica-
tion of the concept of 11 patriotism 11 • We do say of persons who regu-
larly exhibit pro-attitudes toward the advancement of their country's 
causes that they are patriotic, and given this character trait we know 
many things that a patriotic person would do, and many things he would 
abstain from doing. Given this pro-attitude in even one instance in 
special circumstances let one infer a good deal about the actor, if the 
pro-attitude is clearly spelled out. We can, and actually do, operate 
with motive explanations in this way because it seems that we expect 
people to be consistent in their actions; they are blamed if they 
aren't consistent, and are of good character. This is why attitudes 
are essential in motive explanations, for motive explanations would 
not explain anything further than the immediate action if they didn't 
carry implications about agent's attitudes. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In the first chapter of this thesis, I gave a brief account of 
Freud's theory of mind, with emphasis on h1s ideas about the uncon-
scious. I showed how Freud saw the mental development of man from 
early childhood (the stage of pure id), to maturity. 
We arrive at a point in our development, according to Freud, 
where we become aware of ourselves in relation to our environment; 
this he calls the unfolding of the ego. With the unfolding of the ego 
comes the desire for power and personal advancement. These desires be-
come modified by the acquisition of the superego, which Freud sees as a 
moral sense instilled in us by our parents, peers, and community. The 
super-ego is a check upon the ruthless, self-serving, action of the 
ego, in the same way that the law is a check upon the pursuit of un-
bridled self-interest on the part of the citizenry. 
The development of the ego and super-ego, according to Freud, 
gives a person what we might call a 11 self-image 11 , i.e., it gives us a 
particular model for looking at ourselves. This model, because of the 
demands of the ego and super-ego, is one that forces one to try to see 
oneself as a moral person who is in some way better than the average 
man. 
After the acquisition of this "self-image, one rejects from con-
sideration material about oneself that clashes with this model. Since 
Freud believes that no thoughts or memories are ever lost, he posits a 
"psychic storeh0use 11 below the level of conscious consideration where 
f.iO 
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ego damaging material is stored, (in this storehouse we also find id 
material that must be rejected because is too is ego damaging). This 
storage place he calls "The Unconscious", and the process of rejection 
from conscious consideration he calls "repression". 
These repressed desires and urges, Freud says, still exert an 
influence on one's behavior by exerting "psychic pressure" at an uncon-
scious level. This pressure causes (in the sense of impels) one to 
act in a way such that one cannot give an accept?ble explanation for 
the action, since the "real reason" for the action is buried on a level 
that one has no access to. This, then, is how one acquires what Freud 
calls "unconscious motives". 
I noted that Freud sees desires, motives, wants, and all of our 
mental concepts as designating processes, states, or events in a multi-
leveled mental apparatus. 
ln Chapter II I argued that Freud made several major mistakes in 
his theory of mind. Firstly, I have shown that Freud sees desires as 
something an agent 11 has 11 in the sense of "possesses". This sense of 
possession gets Freud into trouble because this forces him to use 
"desire" as a word that refers to an inner state, process, or event. 
The identification of desire with an inner state, process, or event, 
in effect, lifts "desire" out of the context of action where it func-
tions and makes nonsense of the successful way we have of operating 
with the term. 
This isolation of desire also gets Freud into the difficulties 
presented by the problem of other minds, i.e., he can in no way show 
how it is that we can predicate desires of other persons. He also can-
not show how we come to learn to use the word "desire" if its referent 
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is hidden. Furthermore, he cannot even show how the agent can say of 
himself, 11 ! dasire ... 11 • This, I t>,lieve, is what W1ttaenstein meant 
, .• ,'t•; 
when he -reiarl<'ed on the barrenness of psychology being due to concep-
tual confusion. 
I have also shown that it is this unacceptable way of using 
11 desire 11 that leads Freud to posit unconscious desires; the positing of 
inner states that the agent is unaware of would only make sense given 
Freud's misunderstanding of the concept of desire. 
In this same chapter I suggested that what Freud thought of as 
unconscious motives were in reality motives that an agent will not 
admit to. Human agents are not necessarily being acted upon by unknown 
internal forces. Rather the agent either refuses to see a pattern in 
his own actions, or fails to see a pattern because his actions proceed 
from a minimum of thought and reflection. 
I summarized Jean Paul Sartre's critical analysis of Freud's con-
cept of the unconscious. Sartre makes points similar to my own; in 
addition he points out some contradictions in Freud's theory. 
I briefly presented an alternative to psycho-analytic theory and 
offered some suggestions concerning how best to restructure therapy, 
i.e., by having the analyst encourage the patient to be more self-aware 
and less guilt ridden about certain natural inclinations. The analyst 
would suggest to the patient that he be more responsible for his own 
actions, and he would not attribute to mysterious forces the inspira-
tion for the patient's actions. 
In the third chapter I gave a positive account of the concept of 
motive. I showed that asking for a motive, or giving a motive, was 
asking for, or giving, a particular sort of explanation. The 
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explanation given is in terms of the agent's attitudes (wants,- desires, 
aversions, goals, etc.) and gives an insight into the action from the 
point of view of the agent. 
A distinction was made between desire and motive, and an analysis 
of motive borrowed from Alan R. White was given. I summarized White's 
distinction between motives as a kind of explanation, and desires a-nd 
attitudes as factors in explanation. This was done primarily to dis-
credit Freud's identification of motive and desire. 
I also argued that motive explanations can be best seen as teleo-
logical explanations. For what the a·gent gives as his motive is in 
terms of what he expects from the action he performed. Therefore, a 
11 for the sake of 11 clause is essential in motive explanations, though 
it may not be specifically stated. In the "for the sake of" clause, 
the agent's attitudes will be brought out. I also offered several 
arguments against a causal interpretation of motives advanced by Denald 
Davidson. What makes Davidson's claim seem plausible is a misconstrual 
of the way we use 11 reason 11 • I also argued that in many cases using 
motives as causal antecedents does not satisfy an essential need we 
have for motive explanations, i.e., they do not explain. 
In the last part of this third chapter, I introduced Robert Audi's 
ideas on character traits and attitudes to show how some character 
traits are linked to motives. I did this by showing that some char-
acter-traits are also essentially linked to the agent's attitudes. 
This paint was also made to support a teleological interpretation of 
motives by showing how motives, when approached teleologically, also 
tell us a great deal about a person's character, and thus are doubly 
explanatory. 
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Let us now see how these ideas fit into what Freud does with 
motives. First we must notice that a patient comes to Freud, usually 
because he is confused about his own motives, attitudes, or desires. 
He perhaps has found that the things he finds himself wanting are quite 
contrary to his professed motives. He may find himself displaying be-
havior that belies an attitude that he swears he does not have. 
Many times it is the case that patients are sent to Freud by 
relatives. It is often the case that the relative finds the patient's 
actions at variance with what he believes to be the patient's characte~ 
i.e., the patient displays behavior that is not consistent with what 
his relative has come to expect from him. 
What makes the patient decide to come to Freud, or the relative 
decide to send a patient to Freud, is the lack of similarity between 
the patient's attitudes (in the broad technical sense) and his pro-
fessed motives or his normal mode of behavior. This lends credence to 
the analysis of motives that I have been arguing for in Chapter III, 
i.e., it shows that we do relate attitudes and motives in a way such 
that if there is a gap between them we suspect that something is wrong 
with the actor. 
Freud also relates attitudes (in a broad technical sense) to 
motives as we all do, but with an important difference. Since the 
patient's professed motives do not match his demonstrated attitudes, 
Freud tries to connect the patient's attitudes to some 11 hidden 11 motive. 
As I have written in Chapter II, I believe Freud is misled in his 
search by his ideas about our mental concepts, however, he does use 
the same conceptual framework in analysis that has been argued for in 
Chapter III. 
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Freud 1s theory, resting on a framework of hidden causes (uncon-
scious mental events) misleads an otherwise worthwhile endeavor into 
finding what is behind an agent 1s actions. The conceptual confusion 
behind Freudian theory misleads Freud into thinking that he has found 
a buried cause, when his therapy has discovered a motive that the agent 
will not admit to. 
I have argued that Freudian therapy is acceptable, while Freudian 
theory is not. I have also shown how a therapist can retain the 
therapy while abandoning the theory. 
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